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cumulative illiquidity shocks were an essential contributor to the prolonged economic
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1 Introduction
Declines in liquidity in equity markets became an important issue following the 2008–
2009 financial crisis, as well as other recession periods dating back to the 1950s (Chen
et al., 2016, 2018; Næs et al., 2011). There are a number of ways that stock market
liquidity can affect the real economy. For example, Levine and Zervos (1998) find that
the investment channel within a liquid secondary market can facilitate the financing of
long-run productivity growth, thereby promoting economic growth. In addition, Longstaff
(2004) proposes the “flight-to-liquidity” hypothesis, which points out that stock market
liquidity may uncover information for investors. For example, when a negative event hits
the economy, a future recession may be anticipated, in which case investors are likely
to rebalance their portfolios toward safer assets, such as government bonds, and away
from riskier assets such as stocks; thus, stock market liquidity shrinks. Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) construct a theoretical model that links assets’ market liquidity and
investors’ funding liquidity. During a financial crisis, a shock to funding liquidity results
in higher margins and worsens investors’ funding conditions, which forces institutional
investors to deleverage and provide liquidity to low margin stocks, leading to procyclical
market liquidity provision.
Meanwhile, a number of empirical studies document that stock market liquidity and
the state of the economy are indeed connected. For instance, by examining the forecasting
performance of real economic activity, Næs et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2018) show that
Amihud (2002)’s stock market illiquidity ratio outperforms other conventional business
cycle predictors, such as term spreads and credit spreads. Florackis et al. (2014) find a sta-
tistically significant negative relationship between stock market illiquidity and future UK
gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2016) also demonstrate
that the stock market illiquidity ratio is a strong predictor of future recessions. Ellington
et al. (2017) use a Bayesian time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR)
with stochastic volatility to investigate illiquidity shocks to the stock market and housing
market on real GDP in the US. They find that illiquidity shocks explain a large portion
of real GDP growth, particularly during crisis periods. Building on a similar TVP-VAR
framework, Ellington (2018) studies the impacts of shocks from stock market illiquidity
using UK data, and finds that the effects of illiquidity shocks are substantial as well.
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While these studies focus on gauging the effect of illiquidity shocks on real GDP growth
across different illiquidity measures, they have overlooked possible impacts of illiquidity
shocks on other important macroeconomic variables related to the business cycle, such as
consumption, unemployment rate, wages, and labor hours.
In this paper, we use a linear vector autoregression (VAR) model to analyze the role of
stock market illiquidity shocks in explaining a wide range of macroeconomic and financial
variables, including a set of variables related to the real economy, labor markets, and fi-
nancial markets in the US from 1973M1 to 2018M12. We add labor market variables into
our VAR model because stock market illiquidity is often considered a financial friction,
which amplifies cyclical fluctuations in labor markets, as indicated in Petrosky-Nadeau
and Wasmer (2013, 2015). Furthermore, we add consumption into our VAR model, and
this is motivated by recent asset pricing studies focusing on consumption growth and
disappointment-aversion. Delikouras and Kostakis (2019) point out that a fall in con-
sumption can be a leading indicator of recession, and we argue that illiquidity, known as
a strong predictor of recession, can be associated with consumption.
To measure stock market illiquidity, we adopt the illiquidity ratio proposed by Amihud
(2002) for two reasons. First, a high degree of stock market liquidity means an asset can
be sold in a short period of time with minimal price impact when a transaction occurs.
Thus, the measures of stock market liquidity in the literature are in general related to
transaction costs, trading volumes, and the ability to capture price impacts. Goyenko
and Trzcinka (2009) and Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) find that Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity
measure does a better job at capturing price impacts compared with several liquidity
measures proposed in the existing literature, including those proposed by Lesmond et al.
(1999), Roll (1984). Second, as indicated by Ellington (2018), the concept of price impact
is consistent with studies that use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models fea-
turing asymmetric information to motivate liquidity constraints and show how financial
frictions can propagate shocks to economic activity (Bigio and Schneider, 2017; Kiyotaki
and Moore, 2005, 2019). For instance, Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) assume that, because
of limited commitment, there exists constraints on resaleability of private claims involving
borrowers reselling an exogenous fraction of their land and capital holdings in order to
finance an investment opportunity. As the price impact rises, the ease of reselling assets
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declines, and this in turn increases transaction costs and deteriorates the attractiveness
of investment, which ultimately causes the output to fall.
We identify illiquidity shocks in a VAR model using the maximum forecast error
variance (MFEV) identification approach proposed by Uhlig (2003, 2004).1 This approach
has two desirable features. First, the MFEV approach can be implemented either using
a VAR in levels that includes nonstationary variables, or with a stationary VAR. It does
not rely on precise specifications about the common stochastic trend in the variables of
interest (Francis et al., 2014). Second, the approach can be applied to VARs with many
endogenous variables without imposing additional restrictions on other shocks, which
usually would create debate or potentially invalidate the model.
Our empirical analysis shows that the shocks that increase stock market illiquidity,
namely illiquidity shocks, lead to significant declines in industrial production, consump-
tion, and employment. Monetary policy is eased significantly in response to the increased
illiquidity. Despite the decline in long-term Treasury yields, this shock causes a sharp fall
in stock prices.
Furthermore, to gauge the historical contribution of illiquidity shocks, we adopt a
two-step estimation strategy proposed by Kilian (2009), which maps illiquidity shocks
at a monthly frequency to quarterly fluctuations in consumption, investment, real GDP,
and unemployment rate. We find that illiquidity shocks explain the decline in economic
activity during recession periods exceptionally well. For instance, the cumulative effect
of illiquidity shocks explains the fall in consumption, investment, and real GDP at the
height of the 2008–2009 financial crisis period. It also explains the high and persistent
unemployment rate in the subsequent “jobless recovery” period.
Figure 1 serves to illustrate the historical effects of illiquidity shocks on annualized
quarterly changes in consumption, investment, unemployment rate, and real GDP. Clearly,
the cumulative effect of illiquidity shocks captures the important swings in the cyclical
patterns of these macroeconomic variables, particularly during recession periods. Figure
2 depicts the portion of the forecast error variance for log of manufacturing industrial
production, log of private employment, log of real personal consumption expenditures
1See Barsky and Sims (2011), Kurmann and Otrok (2013), and Ben Zeev and Khan (2015) for empirical
applications of this method.
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(PCE), log of PCE deflators, 10-year Treasury yield, and log of real S&P 500 stock price
index that is attributable to the illiquidity shocks identified from our benchmark VAR
model. The solid lines show the amount of variation in the forecast error variance of these
variables that are attributable to illiquidity shocks, and the dashed lines are the associated
90% bootstrapping confidence intervals. We find that illiquidity shocks account for a
maximum of nearly 20% of the variation in industrial production, 30% of the variation
in employment, 10% of the variation in real PCE and PCE deflator, 12% of the variation
in 10-year Treasury yield, and 10% of the variation in stock prices, respectively. This
demonstrates that illiquidity shocks explain the majority of business cycle fluctuations
and play a nontrivial role in explaining long-term government bond yields and stock price
fluctuations.
Our empirical results show that illiquidity shocks have important macroeconomic im-
plications for the US economy, and they provide information beyond other types of shocks
related to the financial market disruptions discussed in the literature, such as financial
shocks and uncertainty shocks (Bloom, 2009; Born et al., 2018; Caldara et al., 2016;
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012; Jurado et al., 2015, and the references therein). In addi-
tion, our identified illiquidity shocks represent a distinct source of macroeconomic insta-
bility, and their effects differ from those of other macroeconomic shocks in the literature.
Furthermore, we show that the cumulative effect of illiquidity shocks was an essential
contributor to the depth and duration of the associated economic downturn known as the
Great Recession, and that it also outperforms the role of uncertainty shocks documented
by Born et al. (2018).
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the theoretical motivation
and the empirical framework, respectively. Section 4 describes the proxy of stock market
liquidity, data, and VAR specification. Section 5 outlines the benchmark empirical results.
Section 6 provides the robustness checks. Section 7 compares illiquidity shocks with other
types of shocks examined in the literature. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Motivation
As we propose to use Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity ratio to identify illiquidity shocks, the
question arises as to what mechanism lies behind the relation between illiquidity shocks
and the macroeconomy. As shown in Ellington et al. (2017), Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity
ratio is consistent with the theoretical model in Kiyotaki and Moore (2019). In the model
of Kiyotaki and Moore (2019), because of borrowing constraints, the entrepreneurs who
have investing opportunities can sell their holdings of liquid assets to finance their in-
vestments. However, they also face resaleability constraints. These two financial frictions
are consequently related to liquidity. The definition of Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity ratio
assumes that changes to asset prices depend on the net order flow. When prices become
more sensitive to order flow, the ease of reselling assets declines, and this in turn causes
investment to decline and, ultimately, output falls.
Before proceeding to our empirical analyses, we briefly describe the structure and
implications of the theoretical model in Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) to motivate our em-
pirical analysis. We will sketch the model here, and the details and quantitative analysis
(including impulse response functions and variance decomposition) can be found in an
online supplementary appendix.
The basic model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) is an infinite-horizon, discrete-time
economy with five types of goods or assets: a nondurable output, physical capital, labor,
equity, and fiat money. There are two types of agents: entrepreneurs and workers. All
entrepreneurs have access to a technology for producing output goods. But in each period,
only a fraction of entrepreneurs has investing opportunities to produce new capital from
output goods. Investing entrepreneurs can acquire output goods for investment by issuing
equity claims to future returns from the newly-produced capital, or selling the equity
holdings of other agents that they acquired in the past.
Entrepreneurs with investing opportunities face two liquidity constraints on issuing
and reselling equities. The first liquidity constraint is the borrowing constraint. This
results from entrepreneurs who produce new capital but cannot precommit to working
through their lifetime; thus, an investing entrepreneur who issues new equity can only
pledge at most θ percent of future returns from his/her new capital. The second liquidity
constraint is the resaleability constraint. As equity is less liquid than money, an agent
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can resell at most φt percent of his equity holdings. In Kiyotaki and Moore (2019), φt is
assumed to be stochastic, and called a “liquidity shock”.
In the online supplementary appendix, we calculate the impulse response functions of
an “illiquidity shock” (i.e., φt falls). The impulse response function analyses indicate that,
when the resaleability of equity falls and only slowly recovers, the investing entrepreneurs
are less able to raise funds by selling their equity holdings. Therefore, investment decel-
erates and capital accumulation drops substantially, together with a fall in labor demand
and wages. Consequently, output gradually decreases with persistently lower investment.
As for consumption, it increases initially because of the substitution effect created by
the increased funding difficulties. However, as output falls, the negative income effect
decreases consumption. 2
In sum, an illiquidity shock in Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) generates negative impacts
on variables related to real macroeconomic activity, such as output, consumption, and
employment, as well as the variables related to the nominal side of economy, such as the
consumption good price and stock prices. We then conduct an empirical analysis to assess
the theoretical implications of illiquidity shocks.
3 Empirical Methodology
In this paper, we extract the exogenous shocks that explain most of the forecast error
variance of a target variable in a VAR, which in our case is the stock market illiquidity
ratio. This identification strategy is based on the MFEV approach by Uhlig (2003, 2004).
As noted earlier, the MFEV approach is a partial identification strategy that only identifies
illiquidity shocks. Therefore, it can be implemented for a VAR without having to impose
additional assumptions on other structural shocks (Barsky and Sims, 2011). The MFEV
2It is worth noting that equity prices tend to increase when facing a negative liquidity shock in the
basic model Kiyotaki and Moore (2019). Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) show that this can be justified
because the gap between Tobin’s q and unity, as a measure of the tightness of the liquidity constraint,
increases because of the fall in φt. Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) show that this shortcoming can be remedied
by augmenting the model to include “storage”, which is an alternative means of short-term saving besides
money and provides an alternative liquid investment technology available to agents in the model. Kiyotaki
and Moore (2019) show that in their full model with storage and government, when a negative liquidity
shock hits the economy, the flight-to-liquidity effect is more pronounced and equity prices fall as a result.
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approach can be implemented as follows. First, consider a reduced form VAR(p) as follows:
Yt = α + A1Yt−1 + A2Yt−2 + · · ·+ ApYt−p + ut, (1)
where α denotes the constant term, Yt is an n× 1 vector of variables observed at time t,
and ut is an n × 1 vector of disturbances with variance–covariance matrix E(utu
′
t) = Σ.
The corresponding Wold vector moving average representation of (1) is:
Yt = β + B(L)ut, (2)
where β denotes a constant, B(L) ≡ I +B1L+B2L
2 + · · · is a n× n matrix polynomial
in the lag operator L of moving average coefficients.
To identify the structural shocks, we need to map the reduced form VAR disturbances
ut to a vector of mutually orthogonal shocks ǫt, i.e., ut = Cǫt. The conventional iden-




′) = CC ′, which implies E(ǫtǫ
′
t) = I. However, Uhlig (2003) argues that
this method is not sufficient to identify C because for any matrix C, there exists some al-
ternative matrix C̃ such that C̃Q = C, where Q is an orthonormal matrix, which satisfies
Σ = C̃C̃ ′. This alternative matrix C̃ maps ut into another vector of mutually orthogonal
shocks ǫ̃t, i.e., ut = C̃ǫ̃t. The identification problem becomes choosing an orthonormal
matrix Q that satisfies Σ = C̃C̃ ′ for some arbitrary matrix C̃ (e.g., the Cholesky decom-
position of Σ).
Uhlig (2003)’s method consists of finding the m < n columns of Q defining the m
mutually orthogonal shocks that explain most of the variance of the forecast error of
some variable in Yt over forecast horizon k to k. Specifically, it denotes the k-step ahead
forecast error of the i-th variable yi,t in Yt by:






where ei is a column vector with one in the ith position and zeros elsewhere. Uhlig
(2003)’s approach solves the problem as follows:












subject toQ′mQm = I, whereQm contains the columns ofQ defining themmost important
shocks. To solve this problem, consider first finding the shock, i.e., the column q1 of Q
that explains most of the variance of the forecast error of variable yit:

























































i)BlC̃. Note that we order the q1 vector first in Q. With this




L = q′1Sq1 − λ(q
′
1q1 − 1), (6)
with first-order condition
Sq1 = λq1.
Note that (6) defines an eigenvalue decomposition, with q1 being the eigenvector of S that
corresponds to eigenvalue λ. Furthermore, because q′1q1 = 1, the first-order condition of
(6) implies the eigenvalue λ is the objective to be maximized, and q1 that maximizes the
variance is the normalized eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue λ. Similarly,
q2 is the second principal component and so forth for all the m components of Q
∗
m that
we want to extract. Once Q∗m is identified, we can study the impulse response functions
in Yt with respect to each column of Q
∗
m, and provide the economic interpretation. We
focus on studying the shock that explains most of the forecast error variance in the target
variable, which in our case is the stock market illiquidity ratio.
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4 Construction of Illiquidity Measure, VAR Specifi-
cation, and Data
4.1 Construction of ILRt
In this paper, we adopt Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity ratio to measure stock market illiquid-
ity. Amihud (2002) measures stock market liquidity using a price impact measure using









where Di,t is the number of available trading days for stock i during period t. During
period t, |Ri,t,d| and V OLi,t,d are absolute returns and trading volume (in dollars) of
stock i during day d. That is, ILRi,t is calculated from the average ratio of absolute
price changes to trading volumes, which captures the daily price impact of the order flow.
Note that Amihud (2002)’s measure is called an illiquidity measure, as a high value of
the measure indicates low liquidity (high price impact of transactions). That is, ILRi,t
captures how much the price moves for each volume unit of trades. After constructing
ILRi,t, the second step is to calculate aggregated ILRt as a measure of average market







where Nt is the number of stocks in period t. We then use the averaged stock market
illiquidity measure ILRt to conduct the empirical analysis. We follow Næs et al. (2011)
and Chen et al. (2016) in scaling up ILRt by multiplying by 10
6 because the original
magnitude of the ILRt measure is too small to conduct a sensible empirical analysis.
Monthly data from 1973M1 to 2018M12 are used to construct Amihud (2002)’s illiq-
uidity measure. The monthly aggregated illiquidity measure is constructed using data
of individual common stocks (codes 10 and 11) listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). All the stocks have to meet the following requirements.
1. The stock must have been traded for more than 200 days in the last year to ensure
more stable estimates.
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2. The stock price must be greater than $5 in the last trading day of the last year.
This enables us to exclude noise from the estimates because a low-price stock can
be affected easily by the minimum tick.
3. The stock must have market capitalization data in the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP) database at the end of last year. As a result, some derivative
securities were excluded.
4. Any stock that satisfies the above conditions is excluded if it is an outlier, i.e., in
the lowest (1%) or highest (99%) tails of the distribution of ILRi,t.
All the daily stock market data are obtained from the CRSP database, including prices
and trading volumes. A description of ILRt is listed in the first column of Table 1.
3
In the first panel of Figure 3, ILRt is plotted, with shaded areas indicating the NBER
recession periods. Clearly, the ILRt is closely related to business booms and recessions: a
rapid increase in the illiquidity measure is generally accompanied by a recession. Similar
findings are obtained for the annual growth rate of ILRt, which is plotted in Figure 4.
4.2 VAR Specification and Data
Our benchmark specification of the VAR includes nine variables: (1) Amihud (2002)’s
stock market illiquidity measure; (2) log of manufacturing industrial production index; (3)
log of private employment; (4) log of real PCE; (5) log of PCE price deflator; (6) Federal
funds rate; (7) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (8) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock
Price Index; and (9) log of S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI). Data for (2)
to (7) are collected from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database provided
by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, (8) is obtained from Robert Shiller’s website,
and (9) is from Datastream. The sample period is 1973M1 to 2018M12, and we estimate
the VAR using ordinary least squares and include a constant term. We estimate the VAR
in levels of all variables, because this will produce consistent estimates of the impulse
response functions, and is robust for cointegrating relationships among the endogenous
3Over the sample period, the number of stocks included in the illiquidity proxy each month ranges
from 1002 to 1654, while the average number of stocks included is 1228.
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variables (Ben Zeev and Khan, 2015; Kurmann and Otrok, 2013). Finally, the lag length
of the VAR is chosen to be four, which is suggested by the Akaike information criterion.4
In Section 5.2, we investigate the historical significance of illiquidity shocks obtained
from the benchmark VAR on the quarterly change in consumption CONSt, investment
INVt, unemployment rate UEMPt, and real output RGDPt. We proxy CONSt, INVt,
UEMPt, and RGDPt by real PCE, gross private domestic investment, unemployment
rate of full-time workers, and real gross domestic product, respectively. All series are
seasonally adjusted. RGDPt and INVt are from the FRED database, UEMPt is from
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, and CONSt is from the US Department of Commerce.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Impulse Response Analysis and Forecast Error Variance De-
composition
As described in Section 3, we extract the shocks that maximize the forecast error variance
of stock market illiquidity measures over a specific forecast horizon. We set the forecast
horizon to 0 < k < 180 months; this choice enables us to capture short-run movements
in stock market illiquidity, while also providing reliable estimates at the long end of the
forecasting horizon. 5 We limit our analysis to one shock because we find that one shock
explains virtually all the movement in stock market illiquidity.
Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables to a one
standard deviation shock to illiquidity, together with 90% bootstrapped confidence in-
tervals, which are constructed based on 5000 bootstrap replications. 6 A one standard
deviation shock to illiquidity causes stock market illiquidity to increase by about 12 basis
points, leading to a hump-shaped and significant reduction in real economic activity, with
industrial production, employment, and consumption all falling in subsequent months.
For instance, the level of industrial production has decreased by about 60 basis points 10
4We set the maximum lag length of the VAR equal to eight in order to choose the optimal lag length.
5The results are unchanged when using alternative settings. For brevity, these results are not reported
but are available upon request.
6The bootstrapped confidence intervals are constructed using Hall (1992)’s bootstrapping methodol-
ogy.
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months after the shock, while the drop in employment and consumption seems to be less
severe but persistent. This demonstrates that an illiquidity shock has negative impacts
on the real economy. However, while an illiquidity shock in Kiyotaki and Moore (2019)
acts as an adverse demand shock, we find an increase in the price variables, such as PCE
deflator, Federal funds rate, and GSCI. For instance, the PCE deflator tends to increase
(but is statistically insignificant) initially and falls after 10 months, and Federal funds
rate also rises in respond to an illiquidity shock initially. These results can be explained
by the fact that the responses of real macroeconomic aggregates (output, employment,
and consumption) to an illiquidity shock exhibit an inverted hump-shaped pattern. This
implies that the subsequent recession will occur three to 10 months after an illiquidity
shock hits the economy. Thus, the resulting economic contraction leads to a fall in the
price level after 10 months. Furthermore, four months after the initial impacts of the illiq-
uidity shock, monetary policy is eased significantly (Federal funds rate falls) in response
to the adverse economic conditions. Meanwhile, the reduction in the Federal funds rate
is accompanied by a decline in longer-term Treasury yields. The effects of an illiquidity
shock on the stock market is substantial; the stock market index experiences a sharp drop
of around 136 basis points. Finally, GSCI increases in response to the illiquidity shock.
This can be attributed to the demand for a portfolio hedge by stock market participants,
because they may want to invest in commodities to buffer a decline in stock prices.
Table 2 reports the fraction of the forecast error variance in industrial production,
employment, real PCE, and stock market index explained by illiquidity shocks.
Illiquidity shocks account for nearly 20% of the variation in industrial production
and employment, and 10% of the variation in real PCE beyond the one-year forecasting
horizon. The lower panel of Table 2 reports the forecast error variance decomposition
results using p = 2 as the lag length in the VAR, which is suggested by the Schwarz
Information Criterion. Clearly, the results are quantitatively similar. The macroeconomic
dynamics reported above thus suggest that illiquidity shocks have important implications
for real economic activity. In addition, our results also suggest that a negative liquidity
shock can cause investment to decline because the resaleability constraint of assets is
tightening, which induces a prolonged contraction in economic activity, i.e., output and
consumption fall (Bigio and Schneider, 2017; Kiyotaki and Moore, 2019; Shi, 2015)
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5.2 Cumulative Effects of Illiquidity Shocks on Quarterly Macroe-
conomic Aggregates
In this section, we follow Born et al. (2018) by employing the two-step procedure proposed
by Kilian (2009) to investigate the effect of illiquidity shocks on macroeconomic variables
at a quarterly frequency. The reason for using the two-step method is twofold. First,
the identifying assumptions imposed on the structural VAR could be arguably too strong
when constructing a VAR using quarterly data. 7 Second, if researchers attempt to
avoid this problem and use monthly data, it is common to use manufacturing industrial
production, or a monthly interpolated GDP time series as a proxy for GDP at a monthly
frequency. However, manufacturing industrial production only accounts for about 12% of
GDP in the US, and the interpolated GDP series might create spurious dynamics.
The two-step method can be implemented as follows. First, we follow Kilian (2009) to
construct measures of quarterly liquidity shocks by averaging monthly illiquidity shocks







where ǫ̂ILR,i,t refers to the estimated residual for illiquidity shock in the i-th month of the
t-th quarter of the sample. In the second step, we use the identified quarterly averaged
monthly illiquidity shock ζ̂ILR,t to examine the cumulative effects of illiquidity shocks
on the quarterly growth rates of consumption, investment, unemployment rate, and real




φiζ̂ILR,t−i + ǫt, (9)
7Imposing identification assumptions on quarterly data implies that all the interactions among en-
dogenous variables occurs on a quarterly basis. For example, when applying the “recursive ordering”
method to identify shocks, researchers usually impose zero restrictions on a matrix C with a specific
order of arrival times of shocks. For example, if an endogenous variable y2 is ordered after another en-
dogenous variable y1, this implies the exogenous shock to y2 can only affect y1 with a period lag. If we
use quarterly data, this means it takes three months for the shock to y1 to affect y2. This can arguably be
too strong an assumption if y2 is a “fast-moving” variable (e.g., stock market illiquidity) which contains
future information on the macroeconomy. Moreover, although the MFEV approach we used is a partial
identifying strategy and less restrictive, it could be sensitive to the truncation horizon k when applied to
quarterly data, because the interval [k, k] is relatively small. See Beaudry et al. (2011) for a discussion.
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where c denotes a constant, and Zt = (Xt − Xt−4)/Xt−4 denotes the annualized growth
rate of a quarterly measure of real economic activity Xt. Specifically, Xt = CONSt,
INVt, UEMPt, and RGDPt. The number of lags is set to 12 quarters. The predicted
historical values Ẑt ≡ ĉ +
∑12
i=0 φ̂iζ̂ILR,t−i enable us to study the portion of the change
in real economic activity that is attributable to illiquidity shocks over the sample period,
i.e., we estimate the historical decomposition of the macroeconomic series at the quarterly
level.
The results of this empirical exercise are presented in Figure 1. Overall, the cumulative
effects of illiquidity shocks affect the cyclical behavior of real economic activity markedly,
particularly during the recession periods. However, the timing and significance of illiquid-
ity shocks vary considerably over different recession periods. For instance, the cumulative
effect of illiquidity shocks appears to be an important contributor to the recessions of the
early 1980s because it captures the immediate and substantial reductions in the growth
rates of consumption, investment, and real GDP, and the sharp rise in the unemployment
rate. As for the Great Recession in 2008–2009, the cumulative illiquidity shocks took
effect in the second half of 2008, and their effect is persistent on real economic activity.
Moreover, we found that illiquidity shocks explain variations in the unemployment rate
exceptionally well during the recession periods, compared with the other macroeconomic
aggregates. This is consistent with Figure 3 which shows that stock market illiquidity
is typically high during recessions when the unemployment rate also tends to increase
substantially.
In sum, according to our historical decomposition analysis, we found that illiquidity
shocks explain quarterly economic activity in recession periods well in terms of magnitude
and direction. This confirms the view of Chen et al. (2016) that the dynamic link between
recessions and stock market liquidity is strong, and it also echoes the findings in Ellington
et al. (2017) and Ellington (2018) that the magnitude of the effect of illiquidity shocks on
real GDP is likely to be greater in recession periods.
5.3 Firm Size Effect of Illiquidity Shocks
Figure 1 shows that illiquidity shocks explain the swings in economic activity better in
recessions than in normal times. As shown in Næs et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2016),
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because small firms are relatively more sensitive to economic downturns than large firms,
it is more likely that investors move away from stocks with lower liquidity when the
economy is in recession, and the size of the liquidity shock to small firms should decline
substantially to reflect this “flight to liquidity” effect. Thus, it is of interest to examine
stock market illiquidity shocks arising from different firm size quartiles and compare the
differences between the shocks arising from large firms and small firms in terms of size
and quantitative importance.
By doing so, we construct the illiquidity measures for large and small firms, denoted as
ILRLarget and ILR
Small
t , respectively. Firms within the highest 25th percentile of market
capitalization in the previous year are categorized as large, while those within the lowest
25th percentile in the previous year are denoted as small. The second and third columns
of Table 1 list the descriptive statistics of large firms and small firms, respectively. 8 It
is clear that the mean of ILRLarget is smaller than ILR
Small
t as the large-capitalization
firms are less illiquid. Moreover, the variations in ILRSmallt are greater than ILR
Large
t and
ILRt. In the second and third panels of Figures 3 and 4, we plot the level and growth
rate of illiquidity measures (ILRLarget and ILR
Small
t ) together with the NBER recession
periods.
Table 3 reports the variance decomposition results for illiquidity shocks to ILRLarget
and ILRSmallt , respectively. The fraction of the variation in economic activity attributable
to illiquidity shocks to small-capitalization firms is larger than that to large-capitalization
firms. For example, shocks to ILRSmallt explain 9.341% of the forecast error variance in
industrial production, 15.423% in employment, and 9.302% in PCE at k = 6. By contrast,
the corresponding numbers for the shocks to ILRLarget are 3.621%, 7.160%, and 4.191%,
respectively, Thus, illiquidity shocks to ILRSmallt explain nearly double the variation in
industrial production, employment, and PCE compared with the shocks to ILRLarget .
Figure 6 plots the responses of the endogenous variables in our benchmark VAR to
a one standard deviation illiquidity shock to each of ILRLarget and ILR
Small
t , together
with our benchmark illiquidity shock to ILRt and its corresponding 90% bootstrapping
bands. The responses of industrial production, employment, and PCE to an illiquidity
8Over the sample period, the number of stocks included in the illiquidity proxy using only small (large)
stocks each month ranges from 234 (252) to 398 (422), while the average number of stocks included is
293 (314).
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shock to ILRSmallt are nearly as sharp and immediate as the benchmark illiquidity shock
to ILRt, and the magnitude of illiquidity shock to ILR
Small
t is appreciably larger than





the 90% bootstrapping bands based on the illiquidity shock to ILRt, which means our
baseline results obtained from an illiquidity shock to ILRt are not implausible. Figure
7 displays the effects of illiquidity shocks to ILRLarget and ILR
Small
t over the sample
periods, together with the quarterly annual growth rates of consumption, investment,
unemployment rate, and real GDP. Although the comovement between illiquidity shocks
to ILRSmallt and ILR
Large
t is positive in general, the implied path based on the shock
to ILRSmallt tracks the actual growth rates of CONt, INVt, UEMPt, and RGDPt more
closely during recession periods, especially in the Great Recession period.
To highlight this, Table 4 reports the effects on real economic activity of all illiquidity
measures from 2008 to 2018. To better identify the relative contribution of illiquidity
shocks to economic fluctuations, we present the data at an annual frequency. We find that
the variations in the annual growth rates of our economic activity measures attributable
to illiquidity shocks to ILRt and ILR
Small
t are very similar. Furthermore, illiquidity
shocks to both ILRt and ILR
Small
t had negative effects on real GDP growth rate in
2009, causing 2.098% and 1.963% reductions in real GDP growth, respectively. It is
worth noting that illiquidity shocks to ILRt explain 1.516% of the reduction in real GDP
from 2008 to 2009 (i.e., 0.582% − 2.098%). As the actual real GDP growth rate fell
by 2.887% and 5.280% in 2008 and 2009 respectively, illiquidity shocks to ILRt account
for 18.563% of the variation in real GDP growth. This result is close to that reported
in Ellington et al. (2017), where stock market illiquidity shocks explained 17% of the
overall variation in GDP growth during the Great Recession. Similar results are found for
illiquidity shocks to ILRSmallt , and the overall contribution of illiquidity shocks to ILR
Large
t
on real GDP growth reductions is much smaller than ILRt and ILR
Small
t . Similarly,
illiquidity shocks also explain negative growth in consumption and investment over the
years 2008 and 2009, which suggests that illiquidity shocks are an important factor in
explaining the reductions in measures of economic activity during the height of the Great
Recession. In particular, illiquidity shocks play an important role in characterizing the
unemployment rate dynamics. At a maximum (across all illiquidity measures), illiquidity
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shocks explained nearly 23.841% of the sharp increase in the unemployment rate in 2009.
From 2010 to 2014, illiquidity shocks still contributed nearly -2.7% to the growth rate in
unemployment on average, which is greater than the actual change in the unemployment
rate. This suggests that illiquidity shocks are an essential factor in explaining the slow
and moderately decreasing unemployment rate (i.e., the unemployment rate remained at
a persistently high level) after the Great Recession. This result is, thus, consistent with
the theoretical result of Bigio (2015) that the shortfall in liquidity from selling capital
will increase the cost of obtaining liquidity to finance payroll employment. In addition, it
also echoes the empirical findings in Chodorow-Reich (2014) that the disruption to credit
markets accounts for a sizable share of the decline in the employment rate, particularly
in small firms, in the year following the Lehman bankruptcy. Finally, our finding also
suggests that illiquidity shocks outperform uncertainty shocks in explaining variation in
the unemployment rate, as Born et al. (2018) finds that uncertainty shocks only play a
minor role in explaining the “jobless recovery” phenomenon after the Great Recession.
Overall, our results support the hypothesis of “flight to liquidity”, in that the illiquidity
measure of small firms is more informative about economic activity than that of large
firms, especially during recessions. This is also consistent with the empirical findings of
Chen et al. (2016) and Næs et al. (2011) in the context of forecasting performance.
6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we set p = 4, 0 < k < 180 and implement a number of robustness checks,
including different approaches to identifying illiquidity shocks, different sets of endogenous
variables in the VAR, a different measure of stock market liquidity, an alternative mon-
etary policy indicator, and different subsample periods. We also investigate the possible
asymmetry of illiquidity shocks.
6.1 Alternative VAR Identification Schemes
We consider two alternative identification schemes for illiquidity shocks. Rather than
using the MFEV method, we use the Cholesky decomposition method to obtain the lower
triangular matrix C, which maps reduced-form VAR disturbances ut into ǫt, but the
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ordering of the endogenous variables is different under these two identification schemes.
The first strategy is a recursive scheme with ILRt ordered first. This is motivated
by the Granger causality test in Næs et al. (2011), where the null hypothesis that ILRt
does not Granger cause the real GDP growth is strictly rejected, while the reverse hy-
pothesis is not. This implies that ILRt is likely to be an exogenous source of economic
fluctuations, rather than an endogenous response to other economic shocks. The second
identification scheme follows Jurado et al. (2015) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) in
identifying uncertainty and financial shocks, respectively. We assume that ILRt is or-
dered after industrial production, employment, PCE, and PCE deflator, which implies
that illiquidity shocks affect economic activity with a one-period lag, while GSCI index,
S&P 500 index, 10-year Treasury bond yield, and Federal funds rate are ordered after
ILRt, which means that financial and monetary market variables can react to illiquidity
shocks contemporaneously.
Figures 8 and 9 depict the results of the impulse response functions using the identifi-
cation schemes described above. Illiquidity shocks clearly have significant adverse impacts
on real economic activity, and the sizes of the effects are similar to the benchmark result in
Figure 5. For instance, a one-standard-deviation illiquidity shock leads to a fall in indus-
trial production of a maximum of about 60 basis points for both identification schemes,
which is close to the estimates reported in our benchmark VAR. Table 5 reports the
corresponding forecast error variance decomposition results. It is evident that illiquidity
shocks still appear to be an important driver of fluctuations in economic activity. Overall,
our baseline results are not affected substantially by different identification assumptions
about structural shocks. This also highlights the advantages of using a monthly VAR to
identify illiquidity shocks because imposing different restrictions on C does not alter the
empirical results significantly (Born et al., 2018; Kilian, 2009).
6.2 Alternative Specifications of VAR
We also consider two alternative VAR specifications and examine the robustness of our
baseline findings. The first VAR is an eight-variable VAR (denoted as VAR-8) and includes
a stock market illiquidity measure, log of real S&P 500 index, Federal funds rate, log of
nominal wages, log of consumer price index (CPI), log of labor hours, log of employment,
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and log of manufacturing industrial production index as endogenous variables. Compared
with our benchmark VAR specification, it contains more labor market variables, such as
labor hours and log of nominal wages, and uses CPI as a measure of the price level rather
than using the PCE deflator. The second VAR is a 12-variable quarterly VAR (denoted
as VAR-12) which includes the variables used in our benchmark VAR (variables (1)–(9)
in Section 4.2), together with three additional variables related to the supply side of the
economy: log of total factor productivity (TFP), log of relative price of investment goods,
and the log of oil price.
All data for VAR-8 and VAR-12 are obtained from the FRED database. We use the
utilization-adjusted TFP series provided by Fernald (2014) and the quarterly average of
West Texas Intermediate spot crude oil for the nominal oil price, deflated using the PCE
deflator to obtain the real oil price. 9 The relative price of investment goods is calculated
as the investment deflator divided by the consumption deflator, as in DiCecio (2009).
We estimate the impulse responses from VAR-8 and VAR-12 using the MFEV ap-
proach, which maximizes the forecast error variance of the stock market illiquidity ratio.
10 Figure 10 depicts the dynamic responses of the endogenous variables in VAR-8. It is
clear that shocks to ILRt sharply reduce the stock market index, employment, and indus-
trial production. It appears to have larger and somewhat more persistent effects than our
benchmark VAR. However, the responses of CPI and labor hours to an illiquidity shock
appear to be insignificant past the 24-month horizon, while the response of wages to an
illiquidity shock is only marginally different from zero for six to 14 months, becoming
zero thereafter. For VAR-12, we report estimates of the impulse response functions for
20 quarters in Figure 11. We find a one-standard-deviation illiquidity shock has simi-
lar adverse macroeconomic impacts as in our benchmark VAR, which employs monthly
data. The illiquidity shock also reduces TFP and real oil price; however, its impacts
are statistically insignificant. Finally, we find that the relative price of investment goods
increases significantly in response to an illiquidity shock after four quarters and beyond.
This is similar to the empirical finding on uncertainty shocks documented by Katayama
and Kim (2018) that increased uncertainty induces a rise in relative price of investment
9We follow Fernald (2014) to aggregate the quarterly growth rates to create a log-level TFP series.
10Because we use quarterly data in VAR-12, we set the lag length equal to two, and we set the forecast
horizon equal to 0 < k < 40.
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goods. Along with the historical decomposition shown in Figure 1 in Section 5.2, illiq-
uidity shocks can depress investment spending. We, thus, conclude that illiquidity shocks
could act as adverse supply shocks to investment because they generate the negative re-
lationship between the relative price and quantity of investment. This is consistent with
the theoretical interpretation of the “investment channel” which relates to the relation-
ship between stock market illiquidity and real economic activity documented by Levine
(1991). In Levine (1991), an illiquid stock market can increase the cost of human capital
for firms, discourage the firm to invest, and subsequently reduce productivity. 11 Overall,
we conclude that the impacts of illiquidity shocks from VAR-8 and VAR-12 on economic
activity, such as industrial production and employment, are qualitatively similar to those
in our benchmark VAR.
6.3 An Alternative Measure of Stock Market Liquidity
We consider an alternative measure of stock market liquidity proposed by Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) as an additional robustness test of the main argument in this paper,
i.e., stock market liquidity (or illiquidity) affects economic activity strongly.
The monthly measure of stock market liquidity proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) is an average of individual stock measures estimated with daily data, and this
reflects the principle that order flow induces greater return reversals when stock liquidity
is lower. To construct a stock market liquidity risk factor, we follow Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) to estimate the following regression with daily data for month t and stock i:
rei,d+1,t = θi,t + φi,tri,d,t + γi,tsign(r
e
i,d,t)vi,d,t + ǫi,d+1,t, (10)
where ri,d,t is the return on stock i on day d in month t. The excess return r
e
i,d,t =
ri,d,t − rm,d,t of stock i is measured as the difference between the return on stock i (ri,d,t)
and the CRSP value-weighted market return on day d in month t (rm,d,t). The sign(r
e
i,d,t)
11This seems at odds with the interpretation of the impacts of illiquidity shocks on real economic
activity in our benchmark empirical findings, which is more like a demand-side mechanism because
positive co-movement in price and quantity of investment goods is expected. Further disentangling the
demand-side and supply-side effects of illiquidity shocks on macroeconomic variables from a theoretical
or empirical perspective is beyond the scope of the current study, and, therefore, we will leave this for
future research.
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variable is equal to 1 when excess returns are positive and equal to −1 when excess returns
are negative. We define vi,d,t as the dollar volume for stock i on day d in month t. The
signing of the trading volume is meant to distinguish whether trades are driven by selling
pressure from investors or by buying pressure. When investors are selling stocks to market
makers or other short-term liquidity providers such as speculators, excess returns on those
stocks should be negative. When investors are buying from market makers, excess returns
should be positive. The intuition behind equation (10) is that the signed volume (order
flows) causes price pressure on day d that will partly revert on the next day. The reversion
is stronger when stock i is more illiquid. That is, one would expect γi,t to be negative in
general and larger in absolute magnitude when liquidity is lower.







where Nt is the number of stocks in the sample in month t. Finally, we denote LIQt = γ̂t
as Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s liquidity factor.
We obtain the liquidity data from Lubos Pastor’s website and use the data as an alter-
native measure of stock market liquidity to investigate the dynamic impacts of liquidity (or
illiquidity) shocks on the macroeconomy. 12 Figure 12 displays the impulse response func-
tions of the endogenous variables to a shock to Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s measure of
liquidity. It is worth noting that because Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s measure repre-
sents the degree of stock market liquidity rather than illiquidity, a one-standard-deviation
liquidity shock causes LIQt to rise. Furthermore, we find liquidity shocks implied by
LIQt have significant favorable effects on macroeconomic variables in general. However,
compared with our benchmark VAR in Section 5.1, the impact of liquidity shocks on the
macroeconomy is relatively small and short-lived. For instance, a one-standard-deviation
liquidity shock causes industrial production to rise, but the magnitude of the maximum
response is less than 40 basis points; the responses of employment and PCE also have
similar patterns. Nevertheless, the liquidity shocks implied by LIQt still have significant
positive effects on macroeconomic variables in general.
12Lubos Pastor’s website: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/
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6.4 Problem of Monetary Policy at Zero Lower Bound
The sample period in this paper covers the period after December 2008, during which
the Federal Reserve lowered the Federal funds rate to the zero lower bound (ZLB), and
kept it at historically low levels. The inability of monetary policy to accommodate the
impacts of illiquidity shocks when the ZLB is binding implies that our VAR model could
be misspecified. To examine the importance of this issue for our results, we consider two
alternative VAR specifications. First, we replace the Federal funds rate with the shadow
Federal funds rate constructed by Wu and Xia (2016) as an indicator of monetary policy,
which is not bounded below by zero and is supposed to summarize the stance of monetary
policy. 13 Second, we estimate a VAR using a subsample from 1973M1 to 2008M9, which
excludes the years affected by the ZLB. Figures 13 and 14 show the impulse responses to
a one standard deviation illiquidity shock using these two VAR specifications. Clearly,
the results are consistent with our benchmark findings in Figure 5, both in terms of
magnitude and persistence, and we confirm again that illiquidity shocks have significant
adverse effects on the macroeconomy.
6.5 Subsample Analysis
In Figure 3, several large positive spikes appear in the early 1970s, and illiquidity ra-
tios exhibit an apparent downward trend over the whole sample period. Amihud (2019)
indicates that the declining trend in illiquidity can be partly explained by institutional
changes in the securities markets and by the means developed to circumvent the costs
of illiquidity. For example, a strong downward trend in the illiquidity ratio is found in
1980s, because many discount brokers entered the market which increased competition in
the brokerage industry and facilitated trading and lowered the cost of trading especially
for small investors. This in turn improved stock market liquidity; thus, illiquidity fell dra-
matically. Moreover, it is widely accepted that, for a number of macroeconomic variables,
there were breaks in volatility following the Great Inflation and again during the Great
Recession. As our sample period (1973M1–2018M12) encompasses the Great Inflation and
Great Recession periods, this may be problematic. Regarding these concerns, we conduct
13The shadow rate of the US from 1960M1 to 2015M11 can be downloaded at
https://sites.google.com/view/jingcynthiawu/shadow-rates
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three subsample analyses covering 1976M1–2018M12, 1973M1–2007M12, and 1983M1–
2007M12, respectively. The first subsample excludes the large swings in ILRt in the early
1970s, and the second subsample excludes the Great Recession period because illiquidity
shocks appear to have played an extraordinary role during this period according to our
historical decomposition analysis. Finally, we consider a subsample period from1983M1
to 2007M12, which excludes the Great Inflation and Great Recession.
Table 6 reports the results of the forecast error variance decomposition for the 1976M1–
2018M12, 1973M1–2007M12, and 1983M1–2007M12 subsamples. We find that the im-
pacts of illiquidity shocks on the macroeconomic variables are slightly amplified during
the 1973M1–2007M12 subsample periods. The large variability of ILRt is accompanied
with excessive volatilities in industrial production, employment, and inflation. This may
result from the inclusion of the observations in the early 1970s (Great Inflation peri-
ods), but the overall conclusions regarding the importance of illiquidity shocks remain
unchanged. As for the subsamples 1976M1–2018M12 and 1983M1–2007M12, it is obvious
that the portion of forecast error variance attributable to illiquidity shocks is close to that
using the full-sample periods (1973M1–2018M12). Hence, we conclude that the empirical
findings using subsample periods are qualitatively similar to the benchmark results in
Table 2.
6.6 Asymmetric Effects of Illiquidity Shocks
The macroeconomic effects of illiquidity shocks have been typically investigated using
linear VARs. However, some recent studies suggest possible nonlinear properties of such
shocks in different phases of the business cycle (Ellington, 2018; Ellington et al., 2017).
These studies find that the relevance of illiquidity shocks is much larger during recessions
than nonrecession periods. To shed light on the potential asymmetry property of illiquidity
shocks during economic downturns, we follow Balke (2000) and consider a two-regime
threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) as follows:
Yt = µ
1 + B1(L)Yt−1 + (µ
2 + B2(L)Yt−1)I(χt−d > γ) +D
1Ut +D
2I(χt−d > γ)Ut, (11)
where Yt is a vector containing all endogenous variables, µ
1 and µ2 are denoted as inter-
cepts, B1(L) and B2(L) are lag polynomial matrices associated with the two regimes, and
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Ut is a vector of structural disturbances. The matrices D
1 and D2 map the structural
residuals to the reduced form residuals in both regimes. The variable χt−d denotes the
threshold variable that determines the regime of the system, and γ denotes the threshold
value to be estimated. The integer d is the lag length of the threshold variable. Typically,
d is unknown and must be estimated along with the other parameters. The indicator
function I(χt−d > γ) equals 1 when χt−d > γ, and 0 otherwise.
In (11), µ1 + µ2, B1(L) + B2(L), D1 + D2 are the parameters corresponding to the
regime identified as I(χt−d > γ) = 1, while µ
1, D1 and B1(L) are the parameters for the
regime I(χt−d ≤ γ) = 0. We follow Balke (2000) to identify the shocks using a Cholesky
decomposition on the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form TVAR disturbances.
We specify a quarterly TVAR that includes seven endogenous variables: annual changes
in the log of ILRt (which is defined as log ILRt − log ILRt−4), annual growth rates of
RGDPt, CONSt, INVt, UEMPt, CPIt, and the Federal funds rate. It is worth noting
that except for the Federal funds rate, the other macroeconomic variables enter into the
TVAR as growth rates, rather than levels. This is because the asymptotic properties of
the TVAR estimators are generally established under the stationarity of the data (Tsay,
1998). Violating this assumption might lead to spurious nonlinearities and can invalidate
the use of Hansen (1996)’s bootstrapping method for inference. We use a two-quarter
moving average of the annual growth rate of RGDPt as the threshold variable, and d lags.
We set d = 1, and the number of lag periods p for the TVAR in equation (11) is two. The
sample period is 1973Q1 to 2018Q4.
The estimated threshold value for the TVAR is presented in the Table 7. The estimate
of γ is 0.02, and we, thus, identify the periods with threshold value above and below it in
the table as “high growth regime” or “low growth regime”, respectively. To examine the
threshold behavior of the TVAR model more specifically, we test a joint null hypothesis
of B2(L) = 0 and D2 = 0. To test for the existence of threshold effects, three Wald
test statistics are computed: average (ave-Wald), exponential average (exp-Wald), and
supremum (sup-Wald) Wald statistics. As shown in Table 7, all three statistics indicate
that the threshold effect is significant at the 1% level.
We then analyze the regime-specific effect of illiquidity shocks by calculating the cu-
mulative generalized impulse response functions of endogenous variables in the TVAR.
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14 We order the endogenous variables as the annual changes in ILRt, annualized quar-
terly growth rates of RGDPt, CONSt, INVt, UEMPt, CPIt, and the Federal funds rate,
respectively. Figure 15 displays the cumulative responses of real GDP, consumption, in-
vestment, unemployment rate, and CPI inflation to a one-standard deviation illiquidity
shock, conditional on a high growth boom or a low growth regime, respectively. We find
that, in both regimes, an increase in stock market illiquidity leads to a fall in output,
consumption, investment, inflation, and it causes the unemployment rate to rise. Fur-
thermore, it is clear that a one-standard deviation increase in stock market illiquidity
under the low growth regime causes these macroeconomic aggregates to fall to a much
larger extent upon impact than under the high growth regime, especially before eight
quarters. 15 This finding supports the nonlinear effects of illiquidity shocks as docu-
mented by Ellington et al. (2017) and echoes Garcia and Schaller (2002)’ findings that
the impact of monetary shocks is stronger in recessionary periods than in normal times.
7 Validation of Illiquidity Shocks
7.1 Comparing Illiquidity Shocks with Financial and Uncer-
tainty Shocks
The empirical results presented above indicate that the exogenous movements in stock
market illiquidity are important drivers of economic fluctuations in the US. It is of in-
terest to further examine whether stock market illiquidity is the source of business cycle
fluctuations, or an endogenous response to other types of financial market disruptions,
such as credit spreads and uncertainty proxies. These indicators of financial distress are
commonly used to identify financial and uncertainty shocks in the literature (Caldara
et al., 2016).
For this purpose, we consider a VAR with 11 endogenous variables (denoted VAR-11)
to identify illiquidity shocks, financial shocks, and uncertainty shocks simultaneously. Our
VAR-11 includes the excess bond premium developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012),
14The details of the computation method of the generalized impulse response functions can be found
in Balke (2000).
15Similar patterns can be found when using a two standard deviation illiquidity shock.
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which is measured by a residual component beyond the expected default risks of corpo-
rate bonds, and a measure of uncertainty a la Jurado et al. (2015) which is constructed
using real economic data, and Amihud (2002)’s stock market illiquidity measure, together
with the variables (2) to (9) labeled in Section 4.2. We use this 11-variable VAR to
identify financial shocks (which are defined as exogenous movements in the excess bond
premium), uncertainty shocks (exogenous movements in the uncertainty measure), and
illiquidity shocks simultaneously by employing a standard recursive ordering on these 11
variables. We assume that ILRt is affected by the excess bond premium and the uncer-
tainty proxy contemporaneously; that is, we order ILRt after the excess bond premium
and the uncertainty proxy. This is a conservative approach to identifying illiquidity shocks
because it implies that illiquidity shocks are residual shocks that are ordered after finan-
cial shocks and uncertainty shocks; however, all can affect ILRt contemporaneously. The
idea behind this ordering is that the innovations in the excess bond premium have an
immediate impact on the proxy of uncertainty, but the shocks to the uncertainty mea-
sure, i.e., “uncertainty shocks”, are orthogonal to the current level of the excess bond
premium. However, as documented by Caldara et al. (2016), the ordering of the excess
bond premium and the uncertainty proxy matters when one identifies financial shocks
and uncertainty shocks. Thus, we consider an alternative ordering by ordering the uncer-
tainty proxy before the excess bond premium; that is, the innovations in the excess bond
premium can only affect the uncertainty proxy with a one period lag, but the innovations
in the uncertainty proxy can affect the excess bond premium immediately. We denote
these two identification schemes as “EBP-UNC” and “UNC-EBP”, respectively.
Following Caldara et al. (2016), we use the excess bond premium and Jurado et al.
(2015)’s measure of uncertainty at the three-month forecast horizon to identify the fi-
nancial and uncertainty shocks, respectively. The excess bond premium data and the
macroeconomic uncertainty index are available at the websites of Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and Sydney Ludvigson. 16 Figures 16, 17 and 18 display the
impulse response functions of a one-standard deviation financial shock, uncertainty shock,
and illiquidity shock under the EBP-UNC identification scheme. As shown in these fig-
16Excess bond premium can be downloaded at https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/
feds-notes/2016/ecession-risk-and-the-excess-bond-premium-20160408.html, and Sydney Lud-
vigson’s website is https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes.
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ures, the identified financial and uncertainty shocks induce a notably persistent rise in the
excess bond premium and Jurado et al. (2015)’s measure, and also generate a hump-shape
and eventual persistent decline in industrial production, employment, and consumption.
Both shocks also have an adverse effect on the stock market. In particular, an increase in
the excess bond premium and uncertainty measure cause a sharp and immediate drop in
the stock market index. We also find that the macroeconomic impact of illiquidity shocks
is similar to that of illiquidity shocks identified by our benchmark VAR in terms of signs
and persistence. However, the size of the impact is smaller. This result is unaffected
when applying the UNC-EBP identification scheme. 17 It is worth noting that, for both
identification schemes, the impacts of financial shocks and uncertainty shocks on the illiq-
uidity ratio are very small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that
Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity ratio is likely to be a distinct exogenous factor that affects
the macroeconomy and financial market, rather than an endogenous shock absorber that
reflects the disturbances from real economic activities and financial disruption. Finally,
we find that illiquidity shocks affect the measure of uncertainty significantly at 10 months
and beyond, which suggests that fluctuations in the measure of uncertainty proposed by
Jurado et al. (2015) may arise endogenously in respond to illiquidity shocks at a longer
horizon.
We further investigate this finding using a forecast error variance decomposition. Ta-
bles 8 and 9 report the fraction of the forecast error variance of excess bond premium,
uncertainty proxy, and illiquidity ratio attributable to financial shocks, uncertainty shocks,
and illiquidity shocks under the EBP-UNC and UNC-EBP identification schemes, respec-
tively. At k = 24 horizon, we find that illiquidity shocks explain around 17% of the
variation in the uncertainty proxy for both identification schemes. This suggests that
fluctuations in uncertainty partly reflect endogenous responses to stock market illiquidity.
In sum, we conclude that stock market illiquidity is likely to be a source of macroeconomic
fluctuations, and exogenous to financial and uncertainty shocks. While the movements in
the uncertainty of macroeconomic activities are endogenous responses to adverse shocks
related to financial market conditions, e.g., stock market illiquidity, this is consistent
17For brevity, the impulse response functions under the UNC-EBP identification scheme are reported
in a supplementary appendix.
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with the argument in Caldara et al. (2016) that macroeconomic uncertainty is often an
endogenous response to broader financial conditions.
7.2 Comparing Illiquidity Shocks with Other Macroeconomic
Shocks
The empirical results presented in Section 7.1 indicate that stock market illiquidity is
likely to be an exogenous factor that drives economic fluctuations, and it contributes to
the variation in US business cycles beyond the financial shocks and uncertainty shocks.
We further examine the hypothesis that illiquidity shocks represent a distinct source
of business cycle fluctuations, or whether such instability is caused by other types of
shocks associated with business cycles, by checking the correlation between the identified
illiquidity shocks and other economic shocks, which are external to our benchmark VAR
system.
First, we compare illiquidity shocks with two measures of monetary policy shocks at
a monthly frequency. The first monetary policy shock corresponds to Romer and Romer
(2004)’s narrative methods and Greenbook forecasts (denoted as ǫRRM,t). In addition, we
also consider Barakchian and Crowe (2013)’s monetary policy shocks, which are identified
using high-frequency information from Fed funds futures (denoted as ǫBCM,t).
We also examine the correlations between illiquidity shocks and technology shocks at
a quarterly frequency. The first set of technology shocks corresponds to unanticipated
shocks to TFP, including the unanticipated TFP shocks identified in Ben Zeev and Khan
(2015) and Justiniano et al. (2011) (denoted as ǫBZKTFP,t and ǫ
JPT
TFP,t, respectively). The second
set of technology shocks corresponds to news shocks about future technology changes,
including news shocks about future TFP changes identified by Barsky and Sims (2011)
(denoted as ǫBS−TFPNEWS,t ) and news shocks about future investment-specific technology (IST)
identified by Ben Zeev and Khan (2015) (denoted as ǫBZK−ISTNEWS,t ).
18 The results in Table 10
show the correlations between illiquidity shocks and these external shocks. The illiquidity
shocks implied by ILRLarget and ILR
Small
t are also used to calculate the correlations. We
find that the correlations between illiquidity shocks and other external shocks range from
18The shock series data are obtained from Professor Valerie Ramey’s website at
https://econweb.ucsd.edu/∼vramey/research.html
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-0.133 to 0.166, which suggests that the contemporaneous relationship between illiquidity
shocks and other macroeconomic shocks is very small. Hence, we conclude that our
identified illiquidity shocks represent a distinct source of macroeconomic instability, and
they are independent of other types of macroeconomic shocks.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the quantitative importance of stock market illiquidity shocks
in the US. We show that illiquidity shocks lead to significant declines in industrial produc-
tion, consumption, and employment, and the Federal funds rate falls in response to these
adverse economic conditions. In addition, illiquidity shocks explain a significant portion
of the variation in broad equity valuations.
Furthermore, using the historical decomposition approach proposed by Kilian (2009),
we find that illiquidity shocks delineate the unfavorable movements in economic activity
during recession periods exceptionally well. The cumulative effects of illiquidity shock
were an important driver of the fall in investment and real GDP at the height of the
2008–2009 financial crisis period. They explain nearly 23.841% of the sharp increase in
the unemployment rate in 2009 as well as the high and persistent unemployment rate in
the subsequent “jobless recovery” period.
Our results demonstrate that the macroeconomic consequences of stock market illiq-
uidity shocks are important. Thus, monetary authorities, which are generally responsible
for maintaining and ensuring the overall stability of the economy and financial mar-
kets, should keep track of stock market liquidity when implementing monetary policy ex
ante. Moreover, we find that the correlations between illiquidity shocks and other types of
shocks are quite low, suggesting our identified illiquidity shocks represent a distinct source
of macroeconomic instability. This demonstrates that illiquidity shocks, stemming from
price impacts in the stock market, may contain information about economic conditions
beyond traditional business cycle shocks in the literature.
While understanding the macroeconomic impacts of illiquidity shocks on macroeco-
nomic variables is the main contribution of this study, several interesting extensions exist.
For instance, it would be of interest to investigate the relationship between stock mar-
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ket illiquidity and macroeconomic variables using an identification strategy proposed by
Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003). In this way, we can also take into account
the heteroskedasticity in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals in the VAR, when
capturing the contemporaneous bidirectional causality between stock market illiquidity
and other macroeconomic variables. We defer these issues to future research.
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Mean 0.017 0.001 0.047
Median 0.006 0.000 0.020
Std.dev 0.033 0.003 0.089
No. of Sectors 4697 1187 2538





t are illiquidity mea-
sures using data from all firms, large firms, and small
firms, respectively. Std.dev denotes the standard de-
viation. The sample spans from 1973M1 to 2018M12.
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Table 2: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Illiquidity Shocks
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of ILR Shocks: p = 4
ILR Industrial Production Employment PCE PCE Deflator
k = 1 92.325 1.615 0.337 0.722 0.038
[85.093 , 96.881] [0.000 , 3.824] [0.000 , 2.355] [0.000 , 2.929] [0.000 , 1.398]
k = 6 88.489 7.200 13.236 8.572 0.207
[80.663 , 89.653] [2.129 , 15.587] [6.504 , 23.306] [2.645 , 16.292] [0.005 , 2.763]
k = 12 83.818 17.254 25.056 10.335 0.196
[71.548 , 85.217] [7.368 , 30.624] [14.167 , 38.205] [2.084 , 18.750] [0.042 , 3.613]
k = 24 78.903 18.247 29.477 6.524 3.965
[65.854 , 82.422] [5.389 , 31.260] [11.732 , 40.982] [1.024 , 13.531] [0.228 , 12.147]
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of ILR Shocks: p = 2
k = 1 95.479 0.001 0.363 0.522 0.327
[90.925 , 98.523] [0.000 ,0.920 ] [0.000 , 2.129] [0.000 , 1.758] [0.000 , 1.947]
k = 6 93.198 14.051 14.891 6.227 0.245
[87.364 , 95.286] [7.251 , 22.442] [8.167 , 23.331] [1.380 , 11.085] [0.002 , 2.345]
k = 12 88.051 26.798 29.292 8.276 0.264
[78.243 , 91.840] [14.586 , 37.491] [17.335 , 40.066] [0.851 , 14.214] [0.017 , 3.097]
k = 24 84.473 25.996 31.640 5.764 3.917
[73.840 , 89.186] [10.713 , 37.255] [15.237 , 43.114] [0.452 , 11.676] [0.023 , 10.378]
Note: The table reports the fraction of the variance in the k-step-ahead forecast error of the variable listed
at the top of the table that is attributable to illiquidity shocks. Values in square brackets define the 90%
bootstrap confidence intervals. Illiquidity shocks are identified using the MFEV method with 0 < k < 180.
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Table 3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Illiquidity Shocks: Large Firms versus
Small Firms
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition ILR Shocks: Large Firms
ILR Industrial Production Employment PCE PCE Deflator
k = 1 91.273 1.821 0.320 0.051 0.035
[83.043 , 96.165] [0.000 , 4.163] [0.000 , 1.964] [0.000 , 1.191] [0.000 , 1.462]
k = 6 90.571 3.621 7.160 4.191 0.794
[82.576 , 91.472] [1.140 , 8.822] [1.491 , 13.752] [0.502 , 9.536] [0.007 , 4.401]
k = 12 86.576 13.642 19.211 5.506 0.674
[73.894 , 87.897] [5.205 , 25.886] [7.913 , 30.377] [0.331 , 12.146 [0.040 , 4.805]
k = 24 81.960 16.997 26.411 3.318 2.453
[67.987 , 84.915] [3.397 , 28.923] [8.461 , 37.382] [0.288 , 9.296] [0.238 , 8.715]
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition ILR Shocks: Small Firms
ILR Industrial Production Employment PCE PCE Deflator
k = 1 93.063 0.815 0.717 1.186 0.047
[86.834 , 97.268] [0.000 , 2.506] [0.000 , 3.055] [0.000 , 3.655] [0.000 , 1.342]
k = 6 88.031 9.341 15.423 9.302 0.103
[79.784 , 88.800] [3.807 , 19.042] [8.017 , 25.394] [3.278 , 17.000] [0.008 , 2.312]
k = 12 83.133 19.269 26.631 10.385 0.245
[71.189 , 84.569] [8.910 , 32.424] [15.614 , 39.586] [2.573 , 18.808] [0.019 , 3.759]
k = 24 78.488 18.970 29.467 6.223 4.828
[65.817 , 81.810] [5.833 , 31.442] [12.976 , 41.757] [1.151 , 12.822] [0.368 , 13.496]
Note: The table reports the fraction of the variance in the k-step-ahead forecast error of the variable listed
at the top of the table that is attributable to illiquidity shocks. Values in square brackets define the 90%
bootstrap confidence intervals. Illiquidity shocks are identified by the MFEV method with 0 < k < 180.
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Table 4: Historical Effects of Illiquidity Shocks to US Economic Activity
Consumption Growth Rate
Year Actual Aggregate Large Firms Small Firms
2008 -3.173% 0.099% 0.014% 0.068%
2009 -4.214% -1.382% -0.671% -1.339%
2010 -1.216% 0.283% 0.171% 0.232%
2011 -1.074% 0.496% 0.301% 0.484%
2012 -1.462% 0.226% 0.132% 0.219%
2013 -1.512% 0.072% 0.090% 0.057%
2014 -0.008% -0.221% -0.173% -0.224%
2015 0.728% -0.033% 0.008% -0.043%
2016 -0.228% 0.281% 0.210% 0.297%
2017 -0.357% 0.317% 0.195% 0.317%
2018 0.040% 0.153% 0.091% 0.144%
Investment Growth Rate
Year Actual Aggregate Large Firms Small Firms
2008 -14.012% 5.498% 3.589% 5.408%
2009 -28.621% -10.872% -4.809% -10.070%
2010 5.791% -0.557% -1.094% -0.944%
2011 1.033% 1.896% 1.065% 1.864%
2012 5.907% 0.869% 0.128% 0.928%
2013 1.097% 1.177% 1.430% 1.165%
2014 1.025% -2.594% -1.805% -2.502%
2015 -0.696% -1.538% -1.532% -1.714%
2016 -8.048% 0.258% 0.083% 0.273%
2017 -0.651% 2.978% 1.662% 2.821%
2018 0.954% 2.440% 1.167% 2.234%
Unemployment Rate Growth Rate
Year Actual Aggregate Large Firms Small Firms
2008 26.871% -3.386% -1.520% -2.633%
2009 71.927% 23.841% 9.781% 22.526%
2010 3.243% -5.862% -2.451% -4.680%
2011 -8.940% -6.831% -3.986% -6.512%
2012 -12.236% -3.545% -1.642% -3.630%
2013 -10.539% -1.570% -1.751% -1.330%
2014 -18.888% 4.304% 2.904% 4.167%
2015 -16.278% 0.455% 0.073% 0.672%
2016 -10.094% -4.098% -2.900% -4.308%
2017 -13.424% -5.648% -3.155% -5.496%
2018 -12.925% -2.528% -1.125% -2.444%
Real GDP Growth Rate
Year Actual Aggregate Large Firms Small Firms
2008 -2.887% 0.582% 0.365% 0.541%
2009 -5.280% -2.098% -1.002% -1.963%
2010 -0.196% 0.381% 0.177% 0.299%
2011 -1.207% 0.433% 0.252% 0.415%
2012 -0.507% 0.241% 0.097% 0.244%
2013 -0.918% 0.170% 0.219% 0.153%
2014 -0.237% -0.436% -0.342% -0.417%
2015 0.158% -0.110% -0.089% -0.137%
2016 -1.122% 0.228% 0.165% 0.244%
2017 -0.391% 0.516% 0.312% 0.492%
2018 0.169% 0.291% 0.134% 0.267%
Note: The first column reports that the actual realizations of the growth rates are defined as the actual demeaned growth
rates of CONSt, INVt, UEMPt, and RGDPt. The second to fourth columns report the growth effects of illiquidity shocks
to annual growth rates of CONSt, INVt, UEMPt, and RGDPt.
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Table 5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Illiquidity Shocks: Alternative Iden-
tification Schemes
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of ILR Shocks: ILRt is Ordered First
ILR Industrial Production Employment PCE PCE Deflator
k = 1 100.000 0.074 0.106 0.313 0.216
[100.000 , 100.000] [0.000 , 1.099] [0.000 , 1.411] [0.000 , 1.597] [0.000 , 1.131]
k = 6 84.714 8.568 11.148 4.976 0.039
[75.149 , 86.770] [3.506 , 15.534] [5.536 , 18.061] [0.990 , 8.996] [0.007 , 1.494]
k = 12 77.733 16.195 19.526 4.274 1.034
[64.488 , 80.302] [5.990 , 25.498] [8.537 , 27.656] [0.565 , 7.964] [0.042 , 4.850]
k = 24 72.906 14.258 19.695 2.045 7.946
[58.940 , 76.715] [3.492 , 22.886] [5.334 , 26.381] [0.681 , 5.765] [0.451 , 16.204]
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of ILR Shocks: ILRt is Ordered After the Variables related to Economic Activity.
k = 1 99.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[95.109 , 99.940] [0.000 , 0.000] [0.000 , 0.000] [0.000 , 0.000] [0.000 , 0.000]
k = 6 82.574 8.719 8.914 3.035 0.189
[72.083 , 84.289] [4.035 , 14.439] [4.100 , 13.505] [0.260 , 5.576] [0.003 , 1.374]
k = 12 75.598 16.204 16.568 2.549 1.588
[62.198 , 78.272] [5.716 , 24.126] [6.617 , 23.773] [0.256 , 5.346] [0.051 , 5.333]
k = 24 70.906 14.501 17.080 1.292 8.715
[56.940 , 74.646] [3.336 , 22.033] [3.462 , 23.486] [0.298 , 5.059] [0.691 , 16.992]
Note: The table reports the fraction of the variance in the k-step-ahead forecast error of the variable listed
at the top of the table that is attributable to illiquidity shocks. Values in square brackets define the 90%
bootstrap confidence intervals. Illiquidity shocks are identified by the Cholesky decomposition method rather
than using the MFEV method. The ordering of the endogenous variables in the upper panel is (1) log of
manufacturing industrial production index; (2) log of private employment; (3) log of real PCE; (4) log of
PCE price deflator; (5) ILRt; (6) log of S&P GSCI; (7) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index;
(8) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (9) Federal funds rate, and the order of the endogenous variables in the
lower panel is (1) log of manufacturing industrial production index; (2) log of private employment; (3) log of
real PCE; (4) log of PCE price deflator; (5) ILRt; (6) log of S&P GSCI; (7) log of real S&P 500 Composite
Stock Price Index; (8) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (9) Federal funds rate.
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Table 6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Illiquidity Shocks: Subsample Analysis
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of ILR Shocks: 1976M1 to 2018M12
ILR Industrial Production Employment PCE PCE Deflator
k = 1 97.082 1.460 2.444 4.543 0.705
[94.731 , 99.126] [0.000 , 5.024] [0.000 , 6.026] [1.142 , 9.929] [0.000 , 2.867]
k = 6 90.407 18.381 12.729 16.572 0.048
[81.814 , 91.552] [8.774 , 29.049] [4.124 , 21.164] [7.894 , 24.829] [0.014 , 2.553]
k = 12 88.228 22.835 18.088 18.171 0.085
[77.815 , 88.978] [8.885 , 34.041] [5.469 , 27.690] [6.101 , 26.015] [0.011 , 3.822]
k = 24 86.650 17.974 15.150 12.563 1.284
[75.595 , 87.261] [4.796 , 28.130] [2.256 , 22.343] [2.434 , 20.046] [0.032 , 6.805]
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of ILR Shocks: 1973M1 to 2007M12
k = 1 94.283 1.587 0.019 0.334 0.250
[88.152 , 98.313] [0.000 , 3.402] [0.000 , 1.711] [0.000 , 2.131] [0.000 , 2.358]
k = 6 91.126 12.360 11.941 7.785 0.252
[81.686 , 91.838] [6.548 , 24.554] [5.092 , 23.551] [1.474 , 13.811] [0.004 , 3.380]
k = 12 87.639 33.278 32.569 11.739 0.390
[73.570 , 88.448] [20.120 , 48.002] [19.574 , 48.012] [1.361 , 18.527] [0.019 , 5.192]
k = 24 83.408 37.271 44.050 8.153 4.951
[68.260 , 85.456] [15.650 , 48.202] [21.839 , 56.985] [1.064 , 15.144] [0.022 , 15.357]
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of ILR Shocks: 1983M1 to 2007M12
k = 1 90.405 0.254 0.019 0.034 3.139
[80.251 , 97.666] [0.000 , 5.624] [0.000 , 8.680] [0.000 , 5.236] [0.000 , 13.209]
k = 6 89.803 6.902 2.505 9.117 8.262
[75.493 , 90.803] [0.659 , 21.476] [0.032 , 11.862] [2.236 , 21.813] [0.067 , 21.230]
k = 12 85.890 15.210 8.834 21.467 9.476
[67.464 , 86.219] [2.279 , 34.557] [0.190 , 22.939] [6.134 , 35.663] [0.147 , 22.458]
k = 24 83.429 21.518 18.618 26.747 9.301
[64.103 , 84.216] [2.788 , 38.941] [1.123 , 33.982] [6.309 , 42.635] [0.070 , 21.233]
Note: The table reports the fraction of the variance in the k-step-ahead forecast error of the variable
listed at the top of the table that is attributable to illiquidity shocks. Values in square brackets
define the 90% bootstrap confidence intervals. All VARs are identified using the MFEV method
with 0 < k < 180.
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Table 7: Estimated Threshold Value, and Test for TVAR
Estimated Threshold: γ = 0.02




The p-values are obtained using Hansen (1996)’s boot-
strapping method.
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Table 8: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Financial Shocks, Uncertainty Shocks,
and Illiquidity Shocks: EBP-UNC Identification Scheme
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: EBPt is Ordered Before UNCt
EBPt UNCt ILRt
Financial Shock k = 1 100.000 0.804 0.275
[100.000 , 100.000] [0.000 , 2.913] [0.000 , 1.401]
k = 6 85.920 3.646 3.426
[74.798 , 89.397] [0.011 , 7.927] [0.629 , 7.042]
k = 12 75.212 4.087 3.460
[59.592 , 80.960] [0.023 , 9.167] [0.947 , 7.759]
k = 24 67.096 4.022 3.428
[50.155 , 71.117] [1.238 , 10.624] [1.324 , 8.593]
Uncertainty Shocks k = 1 0.000 99.196 0.002
[0.000 , 0.000] [97.087 , 100.000] [0.000 , 1.120]
k = 6 9.247 89.566 2.300
[3.355 , 15.315] [79.644 , 92.961] [0.449 , 5.383]
k = 12 14.579 76.778 2.033
[3.971 , 21.269] [57.519 , 81.201] [0.550 , 5.494]
k = 24 14.114 58.300 1.947
[4.168 , 19.928] [38.314 , 65.576] [0.892 , 6.191]
Illiquidity Shocks k = 1 0.000 0.000 99.724
[0.000 , 0.000] [0.000 , 0.000] [97.547 , 100.000]
k = 6 0.133 0.238 82.964
[0.034 , 1.382] [0.002 , 1.630] [71.859 , 84.072]
k = 12 0.422 3.282 76.595
[0.049 , 3.465] [0.012 , 8.964] [62.527 , 78.325]
k = 24 1.974 17.078 71.396
[0.153 , 6.892] [5.087 , 26.583] [56.515 , 73.806]
Note: The table reports the fraction of the variance in the k-step-ahead forecast error of the variable
listed at the top of the table that is attributable to illiquidity shocks. Values in square brackets define
the 90% bootstrap confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the Cholesky decomposition
method, and the ordering of the endogenous variables is (1) excess bond premium; (2) Jurado
et al. (2015)’s measure of macroeconomic uncertainty; (3) ILRt; (4) log of manufacturing industrial
production index; (5) log of private employment; (6) log of real PCE; (7) log of PCE price deflator;
(8) Federal funds rate; (9) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (10) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock
Price Index; and (11) log of S&P GSCI.
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Table 9: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Financial Shocks, Uncertainty Shocks,
and Illiquidity Shocks: UNC-EBP Identification Scheme
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: UNC-EBP Identification Scheme
EBPt UNCt ILRt
Financial Shocks k = 1 99.196 0.000 0.276
[97.087 , 100.000] [0.000 , 0.000] [0.000 , 1.255]
k = 6 81.565 1.155 2.953
[69.972 , 86.497] [0.001 , 3.213] [0.530 , 6.293]
k = 12 70.266 1.562 3.028
[53.975 , 75.413] [0.023 , 5.030] [0.883 , 7.160]
k = 24 62.705 2.488 3.042
[46.177 , 67.461] [0.612 , 8.216] [0.866 , 7.660]
Uncertainty Shocks k = 1 0.804 100.000 0.000
[0.000 , 2.913] [100.000 , 100.000] [0.000 , 1.270]
k = 6 13.602 92.057 2.773
[6.203 , 21.087] [83.467 , 94.414] [0.607 , 6.314]
k = 12 19.525 79.303 2.465
[8.184 , 26.961] [61.203 , 83.974] [0.686 , 6.374]
k = 24 18.505 59.835 2.334
[7.177 , 24.404] [38.879 , 66.126] [0.976 , 6.836]
Illiquidity Shocks k = 1 0.000 0.000 99.724
[0.000 , 0.000] [0.000 , 0.000] [97.547 , 100.000]
k = 6 0.133 0.238 82.964
[0.034 , 1.382] [0.002 , 1.630] [71.859 , 84.072]
k = 12 0.422 3.282 76.595
[0.049 , 3.465] [0.012 , 8.964] [62.527 , 78.325]
k = 24 1.974 17.078 71.396
[0.153 , 6.892] [5.078 , 26.583] [56.515 , 76.806]
Note: The table reports the fraction of the variance in the k-step-ahead forecast error of the variable
listed at the top of the table that is attributable to illiquidity shocks. Values in square brackets
define the 90% bootstrap confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the Cholesky decompo-
sition method, and the ordering of the endogenous variables is (1) Jurado et al. (2015)’s measure of
macroeconomic uncertainty; (2) excess bond premium; (3) ILRt; (4) log of manufacturing industrial
production index; (5) log of private employment; (6) log of real PCE; (7) log of PCE price deflator;
(8) Federal funds rate; (9) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (10) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock
Price Index; and (11) log of S&P GSCI.
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Table 10: Correlations with Other Shocks
Monthly Shocks
Monetary Shocks Aggregate ILR Shocks ILR Shocks (Large Firms) ILR Shocks (Small Firms)
ǫRRM,t 0.149 0.125 0.143
ǫBCM,t 0.155 0.166 0.125
Quarterly Shocks
Unanticipated TFP Shocks Aggregate ILR Shocks ILR Shocks (Large Firms) ILR Shocks (Small Firms)
ǫBZKTFP,t -0.005 -0.052 0.005
ǫJPTTFP,t 0.013 -0.059 0.027







The data of the shock series can be downloaded at Professor Valerie Ramey’s website.
Abbreviations: ǫRRM,t: Romer and Romer (2004)’s narrative methods and Greenbook forecasts (1973M1–2007M12).
ǫBCM,t: Barakchian and Crowe (2013)’s monetary policy shocks, which are identified using high-frequency information
from Fed funds futures (1988M12–2008M6).
ǫBZKTFP,t: unanticipated TFP shocks in Ben Zeev and Khan (2015) (1973Q1–2012Q1).
ǫJPTTFP,t: unanticipated TFP shocks in Justiniano et al. (2011) (1973Q1–2009Q1).
ǫBS−TFP
NEWS,t
: TFP news shocks in Barsky and Sims (2011) (1973Q1–2007Q3).
ǫBZK−IST
NEWS,t
: IST news shocks in Ben Zeev and Khan (2015) (1973Q1–2012Q1).
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Real GDP Growth Rate
ILR Shock Contribution
Note: The black solid lines are the actual growth rates of real economic activity Xt, Xt = CONSt, INVt, UEMPt, andRGDPt. The
blue dashed lines are the historical effects of illiquidity shocks. Historical decompositions are implemented by estimating the regression
Zt = c+
∑12
i=0 φiζ̂ILR,t−i+ ǫt, where c denotes a constant, and Zt = (Xt−Xt−4)/Xt−4 denotes the annualized growth rate of a quarterly
measure of real economic activity Xt, and ζ̂ILR,t is quarterly average monthly illiquidity shocks obtained from the benchmark VAR.
The predicted historical values Ẑt ≡ ĉ +
∑12
i=0 φ̂iζ̂ILR,t−i enable us to study the portion of the change in real economic activity that is
attributable to illiquidity shocks over the sample period.
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Figure 2: Plots of Forecast Error Variance Decomposition implied by ILRt
Note: The solid lines are the portion of the forecast error variance explained by illiquidity shocks identified by the MFEV method with
0 < k < 180, while the dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
46


























75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15
ILR (Small Firms)
]
Note: The sample periods of ILRt, ILR
Large











75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15






75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15






75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15
Annual Growth Rate of ILR (Small Firms)

















Figure 5: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock from the
Benchmark VAR
Note: The dashed lines represents the 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the MFEV method with
0 < k < 180.
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock from the
Benchmark VAR: Shock implied by ILRt, ILR
Large
t , and ILR
Small
t
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals in our benchmark VAR using aggregate ILRt. The dashed lines with
dot symbols are impulse response functions computed from ILRLarget , while the dashed lines with cross symbols are impulse response
functions computed from ILRSmallt , respectively. The VARs are identified using the MFEV method with 0 < k < 180.
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Real GDP Growth Rate
ILR Shock Contribution: Large Firms
ILR Shock Contribution: Small Firms
Note: The black solid lines are the actual growth rates of real economic activity Xt, Xt = CONSt, INVt, UEMPt, andRGDPt. The blue
dashed lines are the historical effects of illiquidity shocks implied by ILRLarget , and the red dashed lines with dot symbols are the historical






+ ǫt, j=Large, Small , where c denotes a constant, and Zt = (Xt −Xt−4)/Xt−4 denotes the annualized growth
rate of a quarterly measure of real economic activity Xt. ζ̂
j
ILR,t
is denoted as the quarterly average monthly illiquidity shocks obtained





, j=Large,Small enable us to study the portion of the
change in real economic activity that is attributable to illiquidity shocks over the sample period.
51
Figure 8: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock from the
VAR with Recursive Identification Scheme: ILRt is Ordered First
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the Cholesky decomposition method, and
the order of the endogenous variables is (1) ILRt; (2) log of manufacturing industrial production index; (3) log of private employment;
(4) log of real PCE; (5) log of PCE price deflator; (6) Federal funds rate; (7) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (8) log of real S&P 500
Composite Stock Price Index; and (9) log of S&P GSCI.
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock from the
VAR with Recursive Identification Scheme: ILRt is Ordered after Economic Variables
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the Cholesky decomposition method, and
the order of the endogenous variables is (1) log of manufacturing industrial production index; (2) log of private employment; (3) log of real
PCE; (4) log of PCE price deflator; (5) ILRt; (6) log of S&P GSCI; (7) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index; (8) nominal
10-year Treasury yield; and (9) Federal funds rate.
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Figure 10: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock from
VAR-8
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified by the MFEV method with 0 < k < 180.
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Figure 11: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock from
VAR-12)
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the MFEV method with 0 < k < 40.
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Figure 12: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock from the
VAR with Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s Liquidity Factor
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the MFEV method with 0 < k < 180.
56
Figure 13: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock: 1973M1
to 2008M9
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the MFEV method with 0 < k < 180.
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Figure 14: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock: VAR
with the Shadow Rate Proposed by Wu and Xia (2016)
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the MFEV method with 0 < k < 180, with
the sample period 1973M1–2015M11.
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Figure 15: Cumulative generalized impulse response of macroeconomic aggregates to one-







2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
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Response of inflation to ILR shock (high growth regime)
Response of inflation to ILR shock (low growth regime)
Note: The cumulative generalized impulse response functions are computed from a two-regime TVAR, with
a two-quarter moving average of the annual growth rate of RGDPt−1 as the threshold variable. The solid
lines are responses in the high growth regime, and the dashed lines are responses in the low growth regime.
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Figure 16: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Financial Shock: EBP-
UNC Identification Scheme
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the Cholesky decomposition method, and
the order of the endogenous variables is (1) excess bond premium; (2) Jurado et al. (2015)’s measure of macroeconomic uncertainty; (3)
ILRt; (4) log of manufacturing industrial production index; (5) log of private employment; (6) log of real PCE; (7) log of PCE price
deflator; (8) Federal funds rate; (9) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (10) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index; and (11) log
of S&P GSCI.
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Figure 17: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Uncertainty Shock: EBP-
UNC Identification Scheme
Note: The dashed lines represent 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the Cholesky decomposition method,
and the order of the endogenous variables is (1) excess bond premium; (2) Jurado et al. (2015)’s measure of macroeconomic uncertainty;
(3) ILRt; (4) log of manufacturing industrial production index; (5) log of private employment; (6) log of real PCE; (7) log of PCE price
deflator; (8) Federal funds rate; (9) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (10) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index; and (11) log
of S&P GSCI.
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Figure 18: Impulse Response Function of a One-Standard-Deviation Illiquidity Shock: EBP-
UNC Identification Scheme
Note: The dashed lines are 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The VAR is identified using the Cholesky decomposition method, and
the order of the endogenous variables is (1) excess bond premium; (2) Jurado et al. (2015)’s measure of macroeconomic uncertainty; (3)
ILRt; (4) log of manufacturing industrial production index; (5) log of private employment; (6) log of real PCE; (7) log of PCE price
deflator; (8) Federal funds rate; (9) nominal 10-year Treasury yield; (10) log of real S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index; and (11) log
of S&P GSCI.
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